Seeds of hope : Assessing the effect of development aid on the reduction of child mortality by Burguet, Roberto et al.
Seeds of hope: Assessing the effect of development
aid on the reduction of child mortality∗
Roberto Burguet
Marcelo Soto
Institute for Economic Analysis (CSIC), BGSE
November, 2011
Abstract
The Millennium Declaration (2000) set as one of its targets a sub-
stantial reduction in child mortality. This paper studies whether the
massive increase in development aid can account for part of the re-
duction in child mortality observed in developing countries since the
year 2000. To do so, we analyze a panel of more than 130 developing
countries over the 2000-2008 period. We use the time trend evolu-
tion of aid to identify an exogenous source of variation. Total aid
has had no statistically significant effect on child mortality. However,
a disaggregate analysis identifies certain sectors of aid that have had
a significant impact. The effects have been larger in high mortality
countries, including Sub-Saharan Africa. Projections based on our es-
timates strongly support the concern that most countries in that region
will miss the Millennium Goals target on child mortality.
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1 Introduction
In September 2000, 147 heads of state or government gathered at the Mil-
lennium Summit to ratify the UN Millennium Declaration, which defined
eight Millennium Development Goals (MDG’s) to be attained by the year
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2015. The fourth of these MDG’s was to reduce child mortality by two thirds
with respect to its level in 1990. One, although not the only, instrument to
pursue these goals was to be a drastic increase in development aid from rich
to developing countries.
Development aid has indeed increased since then, and child mortality is
now lower than it was in 1990. However, it is generally assessed that the tar-
get of this MDG, like that of other MDG’s, is out of reach for many countries.
The main concern is Sub-Saharan Africa, where the projection of current
trends indicates that most countries will miss the goal by a wide margin.
Where there is no consensus is in explaining what is to be blamed for the
likely failure or what should be amended to avoid it. Cited suspects are the
inadequate amount of aid, incorrect targeting, fungibility, fragmentation,
governance, etc. New estimates have been offered for how much additional
aid would be needed to attain the goal, based on the cost of proved effec-
tive interventions. For instance, the Millennium Project estimates that a
doubling or tripling of aid from its 2003 levels would be sufficient to achieve
the goals (Millennium Project, 2005; see Clemens et al., 2007 for a review
of other estimates), a target for aid that has almost been attained by the
year 2008. Others have cast doubts on how close these estimates are to
what it really takes to make the interventions happen and reach the needy
(see Clemens et al., 2007). Behind the discussions around these issues, what
seems to be common is a strong feeling that more attention should be given
to increasing aid effectiveness (Paris Declaration).
In this paper, we look at what has happened since the Summit in order
to answer two related but simpler questions: Has aid played any part in
the observed reduction of child mortality? If so, what type of aid has been
effective to this end, and how large has the impact been?
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We believe that the first question begs to be answered. After all, if
we know anything about child mortality (or the closely related issue of life
expectancy), then that is how difficult it is to determine what matters for
its evolution. Although the strong correlation across countries between per
capita income and child mortality or life expectancy is apparent and has
been noted for decades, it has also been noted, at least since the influen-
tial article by Preston (1975), that this correlation is misleading. Indeed,
Preston showed that the “curve” mapping life expectancy to per-capita in-
come had shifted considerably from 1930 to 1960, suggesting that things
unrelated to income had a major impact on the reduction of mortality in
this period. The shift has continued in more recent times with a major
setback in Sub-Saharan Africa (see Soares, 2007). This has also occurred in
the mapping of child mortality to per-capita income (see Figure 1)1. This
latter shift has been even more pronounced in recent times and for low in-
come levels, since life expectancy gains in these countries are proportionally
more related to early childhood survival. In addition, cross-country regres-
sions typically show no significant relationship between changes in income
and changes in life expectancy (see Cutler et al., 2006, for a recent survey).
More importantly, moving from cross-section analysis to panel data, the
relationship between income and child mortality or life expectancy is even
more problematic. Indeed, the correlation between annual growth in real
GDP and change to the under 5 mortality rate for developing countries in
the 1973-2008 period was negative but below 10% in absolute terms2.
1We have ignored in the plot two outliers with per capita income above $25000 in 1980
(PPP, 2005 dollars): United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. Their inclusion would only
strengthen the shift, but would unduly give weight to less important parts of the fitted
line.
2The correlation is still lower if we consider only the 2000-2008 period or if we compute
the correlation between under 5 mortality and lagged GDP growth.
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But if increases in income per-capita are not clearly related to reductions
in child mortality, we may suspect that increases in aid may suffer from the
same lack of impact. After all, arguably, what aid mainly does is to provide
a country with resources that it lacks due to the low income of its citizens
or scarce government revenue to be able to (hopefully) undertake whatever
policies the aid is intended for (aid is something that flows from rich to less
wealthy countries). Therefore, we cannot take it for granted that aid has a
significant impact.
Our first finding in this paper is that some official aid has indeed played
a role in reducing child mortality, at least in countries that had high mor-
tality at the beginning of the sample period, as most of Sub-Saharan Africa
did. This is certainly good news. In particular, it at least provides hope
that something can be done to achieve MDG-4. We find that aid has not
only had an effect but also identify what type of aid has caused that effect.
Not surprisingly, three sectors closely associated to health are the aid sec-
tors that have this significant effect on child mortality. Our analysis uses a
recently available data from the OECD that specifies donor, recipient and
type of official development assistance (ODA) actually disbursed in each
year from 2000 to 2008. We refer to ODA simply as aid. We estimate the
simplest fixed effect (recipient) model of under five mortality as a function
of aid (and other covariates). We instrument aid using a novel yet simple in-
strument. By construction the instrument is uncorrelated with time-specific
mortality shocks. However the exogeneity of the instrument requires the
long term trend of aid to not be spuriously correlated with the long term
mortality trend in each country. This correlation does not seem to exist,
when we consider out-of-the-sample trends in mortality. More formally, we
rely on standard overidentifying restriction tests to check the validity of the
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hypothesis. In Section 3 we discuss the identification strategy in detail. The
results of this model suggest that aid has a larger impact in countries with
higher initial mortality. When the mortality rate is low, aid has a much less
significant effect in further reducing it.
Some recent studies have also found that aid has played some role in the
observed reduction in child and infant (under 1) mortality rates. Among
these, Chauvet et al. (2009) and Mishra and Newhouse (2009) are the
closest to our paper. Both find a significant but small effect of aid. In
Section 4, we discuss how our results compare to theirs and also important
differences in our identification strategy.
Having established that aid has had an effect on child mortality and
identified the sectors that matter, we would like to explore what this exercise
can tell us about the prospects for MDG-4. We do this in Section 5. We
assume that the level of aid remains constant at its level in the last year of the
sample, 2008. Given this assumption, we then compute our best prediction
of under five mortality in the target year, 2015, for high mortality countries,
including all countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Admittedly, these are rough estimates. We do not see them as solid
arguments in the transformational versus marginal views (as Easterly, 2009,
puts it) on aid. Projecting into the future what can be considered a first
order approximation to local effects is an exercise subject to uncertainties
that are difficult to assess. We claim, however, that the exercises can be used
as starting points in a discussion of the role of aid, or the need to improve
its efficiency, in reaching MDG-4.
In any case, the exercises seem to support the worst fears with respect to
the African continent and some other high mortality countries. Most coun-
tries south of the Sahara would miss the target by a considerable margin,
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given the current trend of affairs. Using the estimated parameters in our
model we can obtain an (even rougher) estimate of the aid needs, if aid was
to be the tool to reach the MDG-4. The exercise shows that scaling up aid
to levels that can be expected to be agreed upon would not be sufficient.
That said, the good news is that aid, if not enough to achieve MDG-4,
and inefficiently as it may be currently used, does still have an impact in
reducing child mortality precisely where this problem is most acute. Between
1.85% and 4.5% of children that can be expected to be born in 2015 and die
by the age of 5 in the absence of any aid will survive beyond that age if aid
stays at the 2008 level.
The outline of the paper as follows. Section 2 presents the main data
used in the empirical analysis. Section 3 discusses the econometric model
and the instruments used for identification. The main results and robustness
checks are reported in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the implication of our
results for the prospects of MDG-4. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data description
The empirical analysis focuses on the 2000-2008 period. Two reasons explain
this choice. First, as mentioned in the introduction, it was in the year 2000
that the Millennium Declaration took place, and therefore it was the year
in which a new global initiative was launched to bring child mortality to
a specific target. This initiative led to a massive increase in aid flows to
developing countries. Not only has the overall amount of aid —measured
by total disbursements— quadrupled over the period but also each donor is
individually contributing to a larger number of countries. This massive aid
effort, whose effects are largely unknown, deserves study in itself.
The second reason to focus on this period is that the information on
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aid disbursements before the year 2000 is of low quality. According to the
OECD —our data source for aid series as discussed below— the coverage ratio
for data on disbursements, a measure of the comprehensiveness of the data,
was around 90% after 2002. As a matter of fact, the OECD recommends
using data on aid commitments rather than disbursements before that year.
We have decided to stick to disbursement data because, as is well known,
aid commitments do not necessarily lead to actual disbursements. In any
case, the results presented below are robust to changes in the sample to the
2002-2008 period.
2.1 Data on aid
Aid data is from the OECD’s Creditor Reporting System. It consists of total
official disbursements in each recipient country on a yearly basis. It includes
bilateral aid from the OECD’s Development Assistant Committee (DAC)
member countries, the European Commission, and other international orga-
nizations (namely the World Bank and regional development banks). The
OECD collects its data directly from DAC members’ aid agencies and from
multilateral organizations. The aid data used in this paper is in 2008 US
dollars. Note that aid from countries that are not part of the DAC,3 and
private aid4 are not included in the analysis because of lack of information.
Figure 2 shows the evolution of total aid during the sample period. Com-
mitments and disbursements have both increased steadily in these years.
Disbursements are systematically lower than commitments except for year
3Other donors include non-DAC OECD countries (such as Mexico and Turkey), new
non-OECD EU members, Arab donors, and, importantly, China and India. Although data
from these countries is not always directly comparable with DAC data, some estimates put
their contribution at roughly 8% of the DAC aid. (See Zimmermann and Smith, 2011.)
4Aid from public agencies and multilateral organizations that is channeled through
NGO’s is counted as DAC aid. So, aid through UN programs like GAVI or GFATM is
included, but aid from private funds like the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation is not.
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2006 when disbursements amounted to more than $164 billion. After a fall
in 2007 aid flows increased again in 2008 in spite of the global economic
crisis.
The OECD classifies aid according to the sector of the economy that
the project is designed to assist. Examples of sectors are "Basic educa-
tion", "Conflict prevention and resolution", "Water supply and sanitation",
etc. Table 1 presents the main sectors according to total disbursements in
2008. (Appendix Table A contains the full list of the 37 sectors.) In 2008
"Government & Civil Society, general", which covers a broad range of pub-
lic sector management activities, and "Action relating to debt" accounted
for the largest disbursements with a combined figure of about $24 billion
or 18% of total disbursements. Since we will be dealing in the empirical
analysis with aid divided by recipient countries’ populations we also report
unweighted per capita figures. In 2008, the list of DAC recipients included
151 countries. Among those for which we have data on population the av-
erage aid received was $133 per person (column 2). However even leaving
aside small, island territories,5 the amounts received varied widely across
recipients. For instance, Cape Verde received over $300 in aid per person
in 2008, whereas countries with similar per capita income like Pakistan and
Nigeria received less than $10 per person. Also, there was wide variation
across sectors over the sample period: the "Construction" sector amounts on
average to only $0.02 per person and "Action relating to debt" accounts for
more than $10 of average annual per capita aid (column 3). Aid increased
in all but three sectors over the 2000-2008 period (see Appendix Table A).
5For instance, Mayotte, a French overseas department, received over $2500 per capita,
and Palau over $2000.
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2.2 Data on child mortality and other data
Mortality data is from the Inter-agency Group for Child Mortality Estima-
tion (IGME). This group was created in 2004 to monitor progress towards
the achievement of the Millennium Development goal on child mortality re-
duction. The IGME has recently published child mortality estimates on a
yearly basis for most countries in the world. The main data sources are
sample surveys and civil registration, whenever available. The IGME com-
piles available national-level data from these various sources and applies
statistical methods to produce comparable data across countries on child
mortality. A full description of their methodology and the mortality data-
base is discussed in IGME (2010). Table 2 presents summary statistics on
child morality during the sample period.
The estimates presented below include a number of other variables that
may be relevant determinants of child mortality. The values for these vari-
ables are taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Mea-
sures of conflict are taken from Banks (2009).
Appendix Table B reports summary statistics for each country in the
sample.
3 Econometric specification
The econometric model aims to estimate the effect of foreign aid given to a
country on child mortality in that country. The following equation for the
mortality rate  in recipient country  during year  is estimated:
 =  +  + 
µ−1
−1
¶
+
X

−1 +  (1)
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where  and  are respectively total aid and total population in country
 and year  ( = 2000  2008), −1 ( = 1 ) represents other 
possible determinants of mortality,  and  are country and year specific
effects, and  is a mortality shock. Initially the only parameter that is
allowed to vary across countries is the intercept . The term  captures
common time trends in mortality across countries. A common technological
shock that entails a worldwide change in mortality would be captured by
this term.
This specification implies that aid potentially has two effects on mortal-
ity. An increase in per capita aid in year − 1 may directly affect mortality
in year . But an increase in aid may also potentially affect some of the 
variables and thus have an indirect effect on mortality. For example, if one
of the regressors in  is domestic conflict and one particular type of aid
helps to reduce conflict, then this type of aid would have an indirect effect
on mortality even if it does not have any direct impact. The rationale for
considering the direct channel is that aid may affect the proximate determi-
nants of mortality through mechanisms not accounted for by . The main
goal of this paper is to estimate this direct effect.
As stressed by Deaton (2010) the most obvious problem with regressions
that seek to assess aid effectiveness is the simultaneous feedback from the
dependent variable to aid. For example, if a positive mortality shock in
year  − 1 attracts more aid during that year then  coefficients would
be positively biased. This result would play against the finding that aid
reduces mortality. Also, note that the insertion of lagged aid (as opposed to
contemporaneous aid) does not solve the simultaneity problem because the
shock  is likely to be serially correlated. Therefore in order to estimate
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the effects of aid on mortality we need to identify an exogenous variation in
aid, i.e. a variation that is not correlated with the shocks of equation (1).
We use two different instruments to capture exogenous variations in aid.
The first instrument corresponds to the predicted values of per capita aid
from a regression of aid on a country-specific time trend. Fitted values are
(not surprisingly) strongly correlated with aid itself and thus they fulfill the
identification condition.6 As for the exogeneity condition if  is indepen-
dent from time then the instrument is exogenous by construction. But the
probability distribution of  may be time dependent. For instance assume
that mortality trends are country specific as follows:
 =  +  + + 
µ−1
−1
¶
+
X

−1 +  (2)
where  is a random country-specific trend slope with  () = 0 and  is
a white noise. In this case the shock in (1) would be given by
 = +  (3)
Defining the instrument  = 0 + 1 and denoting expected values with
bars, the exogeneity condition is  (−1 − ¯−1) ( − ¯) = 0 . This im-
plies that the second condition for obtaining a consistent estimate of  is
equivalent to  (1) = 0.7 Therefore in order for  to be a valid instru-
ment the slopes defining the country specific trends of aid and of mortality
shocks must be uncorrelated. We explore whether the exogeneity condi-
tion is met in different ways. First, note that if  (1) 6= 0 holds true
6This is confirmed by the high first-stage F-statistics.
7Note that the condition (0) = 0 is not required for the consistency of . But if
this condition is not verified the estimate of the country specific effect  is not consistent.
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then a regression of out-of-sample mortality on  should yield significant
coefficients. We have regressed−9 on  (in addition to time and country-
specific effects) over the period  = 2000  2008, and the coefficients were
not significant. That is, there is no significant correlation between the trend
of mortality in the 1991-1999 period and the aid trend in the 2000-2008
period.
In order to formally evaluate the exogeneity condition we also carry out
overidentification restriction tests, which require a second instrument. The
aid effectiveness literature has often used total population as an instrument
for aid.8 The rationale for this is that countries with larger populations
receive less per capita aid on average (Easterly, 2009). Here we opt to use
total GDP as an instrument rather than population in order to dissipate
concerns about a potential correlation between population size and mortal-
ity shocks. As we show later, total GDP is significantly (and negatively)
correlated with per capita aid flows which confirms a negative size effect.
Note that equation (1) includes country fixed effects, so identification does
not come from a correlation of aid with a country’s average GDP but with
a country’s GDP deviations from its average.
The exogeneity condition for total GDP is likely to be satisfied as well.
First, cross-country evidence shows that there is no correlation between per
capita GDP growth and changes in life expectancy over 10, 20 or 40-year
periods between 1960 and 2000 in developing countries (Cutler et al., 2006).
This is indicative of the absence of an obvious link between GDP changes
and mortality changes. Second, we show that when aid is included in the
regressions, total GDP is not correlated with mortality. We interpret this
finding as evidence consistent with the validity of the exclusion restriction.
8Some well known examples are Boone (1996), Burnside and Dollar (2000), Hansen
and Tarp (2001) and Clemens et al. (2004).
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As mentioned before we use total GDP mainly as a second instrument to
test the exogeneity of the aid trend instrument.
The use of a country-specific time trend as an instrument offers the
advantage to allowing the computation of a specific instrument for each aid
sector. This greatly improves identification of the aid variables. Indeed,
identification depends on the surge in aid during the sample period, and
the variability that this increasing trend presented across recipients and
sectors. The use of this instrument also marks an important difference with
respect to other approaches followed in the literature. Mishra and Newhouse
(2009) implement the system GMM estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998).
This estimator is only valid if the residuals of the main equation are not
autocorrelated. This condition does not seem to hold. Similarly, Chauvet et
al. (2009) use lagged aid as an instrument, which has the same shortcomings.
If mortality shocks attract more aid and the shocks are autocorrelated this
instrumentation technique introduces a positive bias to the estimates. As we
will discuss later, such bias is consistent with the fact that we find stronger
effects from aid.
Another advantage of this instrument is that it allows us to capture the
effects that aid received in more than one period in the past might have on
current mortality. Indeed, as we show in the appendix the 2SLS estimate of
 in equation (1) is the sum of all lagged aid coefficients that affect current
mortality. For instance, if the "true" model implies two lags of aid, the
estimated coefficient is the sum of the two lagged aid coefficients. Therefore
we do not need to be particularly concerned with the right number of lags
of aid that we should include in the regressions. We now turn to the main
results.
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4 Empirical Results
4.1 Main findings
The sample is an unbalanced panel of 132 recipient countries for which
we have data on population and GDP9 over the 2000-2008 period with a
minimum of three and a maximum of nine observations per country. The
sample contains more than 1100 observations. Table 3 reports estimates
of equation (1) where initially the aid variable is the sum of all 37 sectors
and when no additional controls are included (all regressions include time
and country specific intercepts). Column 1 presents the first stage results
where aid is regressed on a country-specific time trend and lagged GDP.10
The two variables are significant at a 1% level which confirms that both
instruments are highly correlated with aid. The OLS estimate of equation
(1) (column 2) yields a negative but insignificant coefficient for aid. The
2SLS estimation (column 3) results in a coefficient nearly ten times larger
but it is not significant either, since the standard errors of the coefficients
also increase considerably in the IV estimation. These results suggest that
the lack of significance of aid is not due to a positive bias in the estimated
coefficients. Note that the overidentification restriction test does not reject
the exogeneity of the instruments. Finally, when total GDP is included as
a regressor rather than as an instrument for aid it does not enter signifi-
cantly. As discussed before, we interpret this result as an indication that
total GDP satisfies the exclusion restriction. If GDP is not correlated with
the disturbances, then the overidentification restriction test is a valid test
9We also drop five small islands (St. Kitts-Nevis, St.Vincent & Grenadines, Marshall
Islands, Fed. States of Micronesia and Palau). They are clearly not representative in terms
of the aid received. A full list of the countries in the sample is presented in Appendix
Table B.
10 In this and all following regressions, standard errors are obtained by clustering resid-
uals by recipient country.
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for exogeneity of the trend instrument.
The fact that the overall aid that a country receives has no significant
effect on mortality does not mean that all aid sectors are irrelevant for
mortality. Aggregation may mask significant effects that some particular
sectors may have. After all, total aid includes sectors as diverse as "Fishing",
"Banking and financial services" and "Administrative costs of donors". It
is hard to imagine that aid assigned to such sectors might have an effect
on child mortality and that may explain why total aid does not have a
statistically significant impact on mortality.
We explore this by analyzing the effects of each of the 37 aid sectors
individually. To do so, we first identify and drop outliers following the pro-
cedure proposed by Billor, Hadi and Velleman (2000)11. Then we run a
routine to estimate equation (1) 37 times where each regression is estimated
using a different aid sector. Each regression is run with the instrument that
is specific to the corresponding aid sector as described earlier. Proceeding in
this way we identify four sectors that are highly significant (at a 1% level).12
One of these sectors ("Administrative costs of donors") has a positive coef-
ficient but the Hansen test rejects the hypothesis that the trend of this aid
variable is exogenous, so we disregard this sector.
The other three sectors with highly significant coefficients are directly
or indirectly related to health. The first one is "Basic health" which com-
prises basic health care (e.g. paramedical and nursing programmes, supply
of drugs, etc.), health infrastructure, nutrition (in particular, maternal, child
and school feeding), infectious disease control (including malaria and tuber-
11According to Hadi and co-authors this is an improvement on the original Hadi (1994)
procedure because it is computationally less demanding although it provides similar re-
sults.
12At a 5% level the expected number of false positives of 37 independent draws is almost
2. So, we set the more strict confidence level of 1%.
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culosis but excluding HIV/AIDS), education of population to improve health
practices and training of health personnel for basic health care services. The
second sector is "Population policies/programmes and reproductive health"
which also includes aid for health related activities. In particular, it includes
aid for prenatal and postnatal care, family planning, delivery of contracep-
tives and all activities related to sexually transmitted diseases (STD) and
HIV/AIDS, like education, testing, prevention and treatment. In addition
to these items, this sector involves activities that are not directly related to
health interventions, such as aid for census work and demographic research
and analysis. The third sector is "Food aid and food security programmes"
which refers to the supply of edible food or cash payments for food supplies
(it excludes emergency food aid). This sort of aid may potentially also have
a direct effect on health.
One sector that should be noted because of its lack of significance in
equation (1) is "General health", which includes, among others, medical
education and training, medical research, equipment and aid to health min-
istries. Similarly, there is no evidence that aid for education at any level
(basic, secondary or post-secondary) has contributed to any reduction in
child mortality.
The results obtained by OLS and IV estimation for the three sectors
that obtain significant coefficients (in the IV regressions) are reported in
Table 4.13 According to the point estimates obtained in 2SLS (columns 1-
4), a one dollar increase (in 2008 prices) in per capita aid in basic health
would reduce the under-5 mortality rate by about 1.9 per thousand children
born alive. Food aid displays a somewhat larger coefficient although its
standard error is larger as well. Finally, population programmes aid —the
13The number of observations varies across columns because of missing aid observations.
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third sector with a highly significant coefficient— displays a somewhat smaller
point estimate. If the three sectors are added and included together as a
single variable (column 4), the resulting coefficient is again highly significant
although the point estimate is smaller than the one obtained for "Basic
health" and "Food aid". The F-statistics suggest that the instruments used
in each regression satisfy the identification condition. Also, in all cases
results from Hansen tests do not reject the exogeneity of the instruments.
Note that relative to OLS coefficients (columns 5-8), the IV estimates always
yield larger effects from aid variables. This is consistent with the presence
of positive simultaneous feedback from mortality to aid.
These estimates are larger than the ones available in the existing liter-
ature.14 Apart from the differences in the instruments used for estimation,
a number of reasons may explain the discrepancies in the results. Mishra
and Newhouse (2009) and Chauvet, Gubert, and Mesple-Somps (2009) use
aid commitments, instead of disbursements, over 5-year periods, and confine
their analysis to health aid. The authors use the total of the OECD-defined
health sectors as their aid variable, which includes "Basic Health" but ex-
cludes "Population programmes" and "Food aid". (Disbursements of "Basic
health" accounts for over 40% of total health aid since 1973.)15
14The results are not always directly comparable. Mishra and Newhouse (2009) and
Chauvet, Gubert, and Mesple-Somps (2009) assume a constant aid-mortality elasticity
while in table 3 we assume a constant linear relation between the two variables. However
we can locally compare the estimates at any level of aid and mortality and at the sample
means the elasticity from our estimates is more than twice as large as in those papers.
15Gomanee, Sourafel, and Morrissey (2005) also find an effect of aid on infant mortality
using a smaller panel of 38 countries and four 4-year periods. But they actually find
correlations between aid and "domestic pro-poor spending", which would have positive
consequences on health. The exercise seems to be subject to serious endogeneity problems.
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4.2 Robustness checks
4.2.1 Additional controls
In this section we address the robustness of the results to changes in some
aspects of the estimation approach. In the previous regressions we ignored
additional possible determinants of child mortality. If one of our instruments
—aid trends or total GDP— correlates with some variable which itself is cor-
related with mortality shocks then the estimates would be biased. There
are several reasons that could lead one to imagine that this sort of simul-
taneity may be present in the regressions, even though Hansen tests do not
reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the
error term. For instance, it could be the case that donors give more aid to
countries with better governance and improved governance may be related
to lower mortality. Similarly, the presence of conflict in recipient countries
may simultaneously affect donors’ aid decisions and mortality. Likewise, it
is possible that trade openness is associated with lower mortality as it im-
plies improved access to foreign technologies, which would also imply biased
estimates if openness is correlated with total GDP. Similar arguments may
be given for the effects of omitting other variables such as per capita income
(or its growth), urbanization rates, etc.
In order to verify that the estimated coefficients are not the result of
some omitted variable bias we have explored the consequences of introducing
additional controls.16 The results are presented in Table 5. The focus here is
not on why a particular variable is or is not correlated with child mortality
but rather on the effect that the insertion of that variable has on the aid
coefficient. The variables considered are per capita income, income growth,
16For space considerations we only report regressions for the sum of the three aid sectors
that display a significant effect on mortality in Table 4.
18
an index of domestic governance, trade openness, the urbanization rate and
a measure of conflict. The main result of this exercise is that the insertion
of additional controls does not significantly affect the coefficients on aid.
Indeed, the aid coefficient remains remarkably stable after the introduction
of these controls across columns 1-6.
Regarding the effects of the various controls on child mortality, columns
1 and 2 show that the income level and its growth are both uncorrelated
with mortality. (The results do not change if we include the level of income
instead of its natural logarithm). This is in line with the results from the
earlier literature, which do not find per capita income or income growth to
be relevant determinants of health improvements in poor countries (Cutler
et al, 2006 and Soares, 2007). In column 3 we control for "Government
Effectiveness" which is a recently published indicator of the quality of pub-
lic policies by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2010). This variable does
not enter significantly for the whole sample although as we will see later
it is significant for a more restricted group of countries. Likewise, trade
openness is uncorrelated with child mortality (column 4).17 In contrast, the
urbanization rate is significant and negatively correlated with child mortal-
ity (column 5). This is consistent with earlier evidence in some developing
countries (Haines and Avery, 1982; Merrick, 1985; McGuire and Frankel,
2005). According to these authors, residence in urban areas facilitates ac-
cess to clean water, vaccination programmes and medical services. The
point estimates indicate that a 1% increase in the urban population rate is
associated with a reduction by about 1 per thousand of the child mortality
rate. Finally, as an additional control we include a measure of domestic
17Owen and Wu (2007) find that trade openness is significantly correlated with child
mortality, albeit in a sample that includes both developing and developed countries and
over the 1960-1995 period. In our sample we do not find any correlation.
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conflict.18 This variable enters with a positive coefficient and is significant
at a 5% level. As stressed before, however, the inclusion of these variables
does not significantly affect the coefficient on aid.
4.2.2 Heterogeneity and initial conditions
So far we have constrained aid to having the same (linear) impact across
countries. But aid effectiveness is not likely to be homogeneous in our
sample. Countries may experience different causes of mortality or differ-
ent environmental conditions that may require specific interventions which,
in turn, may entail their own degrees of effectiveness. By regions, Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) has consistently performed very poorly with respect
to the reduction of child mortality, and this may be due to a peculiar (ad-
verse) mix of these factors. In other words, one may ask whether there is
an "African" factor encompassing these conditions, which may have a dis-
tinctive effect on the effectiveness of aid in the region. Or perhaps there is
no such "African" factor, but aid is still more effective on average in SSA
simply because aid effectiveness is related to the level of mortality. Indeed,
in a low-mortality environment it may be harder to achieve further reduc-
tions in children deaths. On the contrary, in countries where mortality is
high, a small amount of aid may potentially trigger a sizeable improvement
in health conditions and eventually have a substantial impact on mortality.
In Table 6 (panel A) we present the results of different regressions for
SSA (columns 1-4) and the rest of the world (columns 5-8). The point
estimates are always larger in SSA. In particular "Basic health" and "Pop-
ulation policies" aid are significant only in the SSA region.19 "Food aid"
18The conflict variable refers to the number of revolutions in the past 5 years and is from
Banks (2009). We tested other conflict measures provided by Banks (guerrilla fighting,
political assassinations, etc.) but none of them was significant.
19This may be explained by the fact that countries in this region have the highest
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has a large coefficient but is significant only at a 10% level (p-value of 68%)
in SSA. The coefficient for the sum of the three sectors taken together (col-
umn 4) is about twice as large in SSA as in non-SSA countries (column 8).
Thus, aid indeed seems more effective in reducing child mortality in SSA
than in other developing regions. Then, we split the sample not according
to geographical regions but according to the mortality rate at the beginning
of the sample period. Defining high initial mortality as a rate above 75 per
thousand in year 2000, all countries in the SSA region fall into the high
mortality category.20 In addition, eleven countries outside SSA belong to
that category. In panel B of Table 6 we present the results for these two
subsamples. As before, point estimates for all three aid sectors are larger
for the high-mortality group and the coefficients are always significant. The
sum of the three aid sectors provides qualitatively similar results. In con-
trast, no aid variable is significant for the low-mortality group. So, the main
message of this exercise is that there seems to be no "African" factor with
respect to the effectiveness of aid, i.e. we cannot reject the null hypothesis
that estimates in columns 1-4 in panel A are equal to the corresponding
estimates in panel B. What seems to drive aid effectiveness is the mortality
level rather than specific geographical characteristics of countries.
It is also worth mentioning an additional point. The literature has dis-
cussed the negative effects of food aid from the United States to developing
countries. Nunn and Qian (2010) argue that this sort of aid represents a
significant source of resources for governments in recipient countries and so
it may lead to inefficient political incentives, nepotism or domestic conflict.
infectious disease prevalence rates (including HIV) and thus interventions tackling these
diseases such as prevention and treatment may have a larger impact there than in the rest
of the world, on average.
20The sample average rate in 2000 was 76.
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Although the cases of some countries support this view,21 we find that food
aid in general has significantly reduced child mortality in Africa and other
high mortality countries elsewhere.
4.2.3 The role of governance
The empirical evidence on the link between domestic governance and aid
effectiveness is still subject to debate. This controversy is best illustrated by
the exchange initiated by the paper by Burnside and Dollar (2000) and the
reply by Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2004) on the issue of whether aid
has a higher impact on growth in developing countries with good policies.22
We have previously mentioned that in our sample of aid recipient coun-
tries "Government efficiency" is uncorrelated with mortality and the inclu-
sion of this index in the regressions does not affect the coefficients on aid.
Now we investigate whether governance, as measured by this index, plays
any role in the high mortality group. There are a number of reasons to
believe that this could be the case. First, government effectiveness is more
likely to make a difference in an environment where health conditions are
adverse. An effective government is more able to achieve better results
with scarce resources than an inefficient one both in underdeveloped and
developed countries. But higher efficiency is likely to lead to better health
outcomes if improving health is cheaper. In contrast, in a context where
reducing mortality is expensive, government effectiveness is less likely to
make a significant difference in terms of mortality progress. In the previous
subsection we already discussed indications that aid is more effective in high
mortality countries, and so it may well be the case that reducing mortality
21Nunn and Qian (2010) cite the experiences of Rwanda and Somalia in the early 1990s
and Zimbabwe in 2003.
22One of the most recent contributions to the debate is Brückner (2011).
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is cheaper in those countries. Is government effectiveness important in this
more responsive group of recipients?
We test the role of governance for the subsample of high-mortality coun-
tries in Table 7. Column 1 introduces the Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi’s
(2010) indicator of government efficiency (the same one that we used in Ta-
ble 5). Now governance enters significantly and with a negative sign. To
illustrate magnitudes, a one standard deviation increase in government ef-
ficiency (equal to 0537 for the high mortality sample) is associated with a
reduction in the child mortality rate of 33 per thousand. In column 2 we
introduce an interaction term between governance and aid. The negative
sign implies that better governance improves aid effectiveness. Note how-
ever that governance’s main effect and the interaction term are significant at
the 10% level only. Column 3 includes only the interaction variable which is
now significant at a 5% level. Finally columns 5-8 replicate the regressions
by substituting government efficiency with an indicator of corruption.23 The
results are qualitatively similar except for the fact that when both the main
effect and the interaction term are included none is significant. Overall, our
findings favour the hypothesis that governance improves aid effectiveness in
countries where mortality is high.
Note, on the other hand, that the inclusion of indexes of governance does
not affect the qualitative results with respect to the effect of aid on child
mortality, i.e., aid has significantly reduced child mortality in those countries
characterized by high child mortality rates at the beginning of our sample
period. If that is so, what does this tell us about the prospects of MDG-4?
Will they be attainable through scaling up as suggested in previous studies?
We turn to this final question in the following section.
23To do this we use the indicator "Corruption control" by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mas-
truzzi (2010). A higher magnitude in the indicator implies less corruption.
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5 The prospects for MDG-4
Two important conclusions emerge from the previous exercises. First of all,
some sectors of aid activity seem to have significantly contributed to the
reduction in child mortality in developing countries. Second, there is some
evidence that aid has been more effective in high mortality countries, i.e.,
precisely where reducing child mortality is most urgent. In this section we
will present projections of under-5 mortality for high-mortality countries for
the year 2015, the year for which the MDG’s set targets. We will also discuss
the relative size of the effect of aid on mortality implied by our estimates in
the previous sections.
We should be quick to recognize the limitations in the prediction power
of the exercises we are about to present. Particularly important is the fact
that our projections take steps beyond marginal changes in the variables
involved. Once these limitations are accepted, it is also clear that some
estimates of this kind necessarily underlie any assessment of the expected
progress of the Millennium initiative. The goal of this section is to offer one
estimate, arguably the most firmly rooted in data, of what can be expected
for 2015 considering the way things are going.
It makes sense to confine attention to high-mortality countries as defined
in the previous section. As we have mentioned, this includes SSA and other
countries where most analysts expect the MDG-4 (and others) to be missed
by a large margin. Also, we have found that this is the region where aid has
had a more marked impact, and so it is the one where aid seems to have a
clearer role in improving things.
We begin by obtaining the best point prediction of child mortality for
2015 assuming the latest aid levels in the sample (2008). We do that by pro-
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jecting a child mortality equation estimated with 2000-2008 data. For that
purpose, we need to introduce some notion of (exogenous to the process we
are illustrating) dynamics in child mortality. Time dummies were sufficient
to take care of that in observed data, but we cannot project the effect of
those variables into the future. So, we will start by estimating a modified
equation (1) that includes a time trend common to all countries but does
not include time dummies (or other controls). That is,
 =  +  · + 
µ−1
−1
¶
+  (4)
where again  is child mortality in country  and year , −1−1 is (instru-
mented) lagged aid per capita, and  will represent the time trend in child
mortality.
We have estimated this equation setting  as the total of the three aid
sectors that do have a significant effect on child mortality. We have also
estimated the same model but using each of the three sectors as a different
covariate. In each of the estimations, we have considered the sample of high
mortality countries. As could be expected, the results are almost identical
to those obtained in previous sections for each of the specifications of aid.
In Table 8 we present these estimates.
Using these point estimates we can now extrapolate the values of child
mortality throughout 2015 for each country in the subsample. The results
of this exercise are presented in Table 9. We also include the MDG-4 target
for each country, and also a hypothetical, less ambitious target of a 50%
reduction in the 1990 level of child mortality, instead of the MDG’s two
thirds reduction target.
The projections reinforce the widespread view that the MDG-4 will be
missed by a large number of countries, particularly those of SSA. According
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to these projections, of the 55 high-mortality countries considered24, only
7 are clearly on track. Of those, 5 are among the 13 high mortality coun-
tries not in Africa. That is, of the 42 high mortality countries in SSA only
2, Madagascar and Eritrea, are on track. In addition, 2 more countries,
Botswana and Namibia, may also attain the target, depending on the pro-
jection used.25 Together, these four countries represent only 3.5% of the
SSA population.
Perhaps even more important, most of these countries will not only miss
the target but will do so by a wide margin. Indeed, most of them will miss
the target by more than 50%. Put in other words, they will not see their
child mortality rate fall to half its 1990 level. In the last column, we have
added the figure corresponding to this less ambitious target. We can see that
the list of countries that will meet this lowered aspiration in SSA includes
only 4 new countries (Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, and Liberia), perhaps 7
(Gabon, Gambia and even Djibouti may join the list, according to some
of the projections). In other words, 31 out of 42 Sub-Saharan countries
will miss the MDG-4 target by more than 50%. In the rest of the world,
the prospects are less gloomy. Indeed, only two high mortality countries,
Pakistan and Cambodia, will most probably miss this less ambitious target.
Is there any hope that, by simply scaling up aid, the MDG-4 will be
attained? This has been a much debated question. We may contribute to
the discussion by performing what is merely a first order approximation —
24Zimbabwe is not in the projections because of missing data in 2008.
25Actually, the projections using sector "Population policies/programmes and reproduc-
tive health" as aid, result in a negative mortality rate for Botswana. That is due to the
fact that in 2008 Botswana received an extraordinarily large amount of aid in this sector,
amounting to 120 dollars per capita compared to 20 dollars the previous year, a record
year itself. Remember that this aid sector includes aid directed to fight HIV, and that
HIV prevalence in those years was above 25% in Botswana. Namibia was also a heavy
recipient of aid in the years 2006 thru 2008 with totals for the three categories above 40
dollars per capita, most of them in the "Population policies" sector.
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undoubtedly a very rough approximation in this case— of how much more aid
would be required for each high mortality country to reach the goal. We can
do so by computing what the (constant) term −1−1 would have to be in (4)
for each of those countries, in order to reach their target. Depending on the
projection used, these estimations of aid needs add up to something between
$130bn and $360bn, if we restrict attention to the three sectors that were
found to have a significant effect on child mortality. Compare that total to
the level of aid in 2008 accruing to these countries under these three sectors:
slightly above $9 bn. The figures seem to support those who believe that
scaling up aid will not suffice, unless that scaling up is accompanied by a
much improved focus and efficiency.
But, what is the quantitative impact that aid is having on child mortal-
ity? Our exercise allows an approximate answer to this question by com-
puting a projection of child mortality in 2015 if all aid in the three sectors
found to have a significant impact on child mortality was dropped, and
comparing those figures with the figures obtained in our projections under
the assumption that aid remains constant at the 2008 levels (see Table 10).
In terms of attaining the MDG-4 goals, that would mean that Madagascar
would still attain the goal, as probably would Eritrea, but not Namibia or
Botswana. Outside Africa, East Timor would miss the target and Bolivia
would risk missing it too. If we consider the 50%-reduction target, then
Gambia, Liberia, and Djibouti would lose all their chances of attaining it,
and Gabon, Ghana, Malawi, Senegal, and Papua New Guinea would see
their chances seriously reduced. So, it seems that some of the few success
stories may indeed depend on aid.
Additionally, we could assess the impact on the absolute number of child
deaths that aid (at the 2008 levels) is expected to have. For that exercise,
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we may assume that the number of children born alive remains constant
at its 2008 level throughout 2015. According to these assumptions and
projections, aid would save between 104,000 and 253,000 children born in
year 2015 from dying by the age of 5 in high mortality countries. This
represents something between 1.85% and 4.5% of the children born that
year that are expected to die by the age of five in the absence of aid.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have assessed the effect of official development aid on the
observed pattern of reduced child mortality over the 2000-2008 period. We
have used a panel from the OECD’s Creditor Reporting System on aid dis-
bursements by sectors and recipient country. As an identification strategy,
a time trend on aid for each recipient has been used to instrument aid. We
have also used the size of real GDP of the recipient country as a second
instrumental variable for per capita aid. That allowed us to identify three
types of aid, all of which are related to health, that have had a significant
impact on child mortality. The effect appears to have been larger in coun-
tries that started with a high rate of child mortality. In that regard, the
paper carries good news: despite many shortcomings that can be suspected
in the effectiveness of aid, some types of aid do seem to be contributing to
reducing child mortality.
The dark side of this conclusion is that although aid flows have drastically
increased in the last decade the levels of child mortality cannot be expected
to shrink sufficiently in the near future. In particular, the target set in the
Millennium Declaration of reducing child mortality by 2015 to one third of
its level in 1990 will be missed in most high mortality countries by wide
margins, particularly in SSA.
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8 Appendix
In the regressions we assume that mortality is affected only by one year
lagged per capita aid −1. Here we show that if further lags in aid also
determine current mortality then the estimated parameter on −1 is the
sum of all relevant lagged aid parameters. More specifically, assume that
the past  aid lags determine mortality,
 =  +  +
X
=1
− +  (5)
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The aid variable can be written as  = 0 + 1 +  where 0 and 1
are country specific parameters obtained from a regression of aid on a time
trend. Substituting into (5) we obtain:
 =  +  +∆ (0 + 1 (− 1)) +  +  (6)
=  +  +∆ (1 (− 1)) +  + 
where∆ =P=1 , = +∆0−1P=2 ( − 1) , and  ≡P=1 −.
So the OLS estimate ∆ of (6) (i.e. the second stage regression when the in-
strument for aid is a country-specific time trend) is unbiased, since 1 (− 1)
is uncorrelated with .
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Table 1. Main aid sectors (disbursements in 2008 dollars).
Total, 2008 
(Million dollars)
Per capita, 
2008
Per capita, 
Average 
2000‐2008
Per capita, 
Change 
2000‐2008
SECTOR (1) (2) (3) (4)
Government & Civil Society ‐ General 12 172.3 10.93 7.96 5.53
Action Relating to Debt 11 928.5 13.86 10.18 8.48
Emergency Response 9 498.4 3.35 2.79 0.77
Population Pol./Progr. & Reproductive Health 8 227.7
3.98 1.84 1.59
Transport & Storage 7 588.2 9.73 6.82 ‐1.38
Total Aid (37 sectors) 131 920.0 133.65 97.23 53.85
Per capita figures are simple averages across aid recipient countries
Table 2. Under‐5 mortality rate (per 1000 children born alive).
Year Countries Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
(Unweighted)
2000 129 77.1 61.8 5.3 250.3
2001 129 74.9 60.7 5.2 243.0
2002 129 72.8 59.5 5.1 236.0
2003 126 72.2 58.3 7.4 229.2
2004 125 70.5 57.3 7.2 222.6
2005 124 68.8 56.4 6.8 216.2
2006 128 65.1 55.3 6.4 209.9
2007 127 62.9 54.4 6.0 209.0
2008 125 61.6 53.6 5.7 209.0
Table 3: The effects of total aid on child mortality (Under‐5 mortality rate)
Per capita aid Child Mortality Child Mortality Child Mortality
OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Trend aid 1.044***
(0.0700)
Total GDP ‐1.73e‐05*** 1.73e‐06
(5.14e‐06) (4.75e‐06)
Lagged per capita aid ‐0.00183 ‐0.0190 ‐0.0185
(0.00581) (0.0329) (0.0335)
Observations 1,142 1,142 1,142 1,142
R‐squared 0.369 0.540
Number of countries 132 132 132 132
F‐test for instruments in first‐stage regression 177.0 219.0
Hansen J test p‐value 0.697
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Time and country effects included in all regressions
Dependent Variable
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Instruments for lagged per capita aid are trend aid and total GDP (column 3) and trend aid only (column 4). 
See section 3 for a detailed explanation of the instruments and estimation strategy.
Table 4 ‐ Impact of specific aid sectors.
Dependent variable: Under‐5 mortality rate
Basic Health
Population 
Programmes Food aid
Health + 
Population + 
Food Basic Health
Population 
Programmes Food aid
Health + 
Population + 
Food
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Lagged per capita aid ‐1.899*** ‐0.978*** ‐2.858*** ‐0.980*** ‐0.559*** ‐0.664*** ‐0.686*** ‐0.490***
(0.585) (0.358) (0.838) (0.257) (0.190) (0.247) (0.225) (0.114)
Observations 1,129 1,101 1,012 1,141 1,129 1,101 1,012 1,141
R‐squared 0.553 0.577 0.555 0.584
Number of countries 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132
F‐test for instruments in first‐stage regression 43.90 18.82 265.3 30.03
Hansen J test p‐value 0.721 0.601 0.965 0.187
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Time and country effects included in all regressions
2SLS Estimation
 Aid variable is:
OLS Estimation
 Aid variable is:
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Instruments for lagged per capita aid are trend aid and total GDP. See section 3 for a detailed 
explanation of the instruments.
Table 5. Effect of additional controls.
Dependent variable: Under‐5 mortality rate
Lag of: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Aid (Basic Health + Pop. Programmes + Food) ‐0.981*** ‐0.959*** ‐0.930*** ‐0.976*** ‐0.932*** ‐0.911***
(0.253) (0.256) (0.240) (0.267) (0.249) (0.246)
Log(Per capita GDP) ‐0.361 ‐0.713 ‐1.370 ‐1.159 ‐2.049 ‐1.960
(5.246) (5.087) (5.809) (5.371) (5.285) (5.127)
Change of Log(Per capita GDP) 2.319 ‐3.186 ‐3.314 ‐2.981 ‐2.220
(5.605) (5.379) (6.035) (5.849) (5.750)
Government Efficiency 0.759 0.582 0.509 0.833
(2.076) (2.031) (1.960) (1.848)
Log ((Exports+Imports)/GDP) ‐0.301 ‐0.157 ‐0.344
(3.017) (2.963) (2.867)
Urbanization rate (% of total population) ‐0.948** ‐1.051**
(0.443) (0.431)
Revolutions 4.407**
(2.123)
Observations 1,137 1,131 871 841 841 839
Number of countries 131 131 128 126 126 126
F‐test for instruments in first‐stage regression 24.50 24.59 28.00 26.62 23.28 25.15
Hansen J test p‐value 0.210 0.220 0.293 0.286 0.774 0.969
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Time and country effects included in all regressions
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Instruments for lagged per capita aid are trend aid and total GDP. See section 3 for a detailed 
explanation of the instruments.
Table 6. The Effect of Aid by Region.
Dependent variable: Under‐5 mortality rate
PANEL A
Basic Health
Population 
Programmes Food aid
Health + 
Population + 
Food Basic Health
Population 
Programmes Food aid
Health + 
Population + 
Food
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Lagged Aid ‐3.233** ‐0.935*** ‐3.973* ‐0.973** ‐0.823 ‐0.147 ‐1.621*** ‐0.466*
(1.424) (0.356) (2.177) (0.386) (0.544) (0.233) (0.321) (0.278)
Observations 408 400 365 412 721 701 647 729
Number of countries 46 46 46 46 86 86 86 86
F‐test for instruments in first‐stage regression 90.63 6.113 63.66 9.913 10.53 1105 743.5 67.66
Hansen J test p‐value 0.671 0.746 0.210 0.616 0.162 0.228 0.149 0.127
PANEL B
Basic Health
Population 
Programmes Food aid
Health + 
Population + 
Food Basic Health
Population 
Programmes Food aid
Health + 
Population + 
Food
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Lagged Aid ‐2.117** ‐0.748** ‐1.997** ‐0.766*** ‐0.0473 ‐0.0296 ‐0.552 ‐0.0840
(0.928) (0.331) (1.008) (0.297) (0.297) (0.0701) (0.346) (0.120)
Observations 499 487 442 502 621 606 561 630
Number of countries 56 56 56 56 73 73 73 73
F‐test for instruments in first‐stage regression 146.2 31.04 110.0 54.96 4.910 5275 97.06 29.50
Hansen J test p‐value 0.437 0.605 0.912 0.315 0.189 0.212 0.146 0.182
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Time and country effects included in all regressions
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Instruments for lagged per capita aid are trend aid and total GDP. See section 3 for a detailed 
explanation of the instruments.
Other Developing CountriesSub‐Saharan Africa
Low Initial MortalityHigh Initial Mortality (>=75 per thousand in 2000)
 Aid variable is:  Aid variable is:
 Aid variable is:  Aid variable is:
Table 7. Governance and aid effectiveness.
Dependent variable: Under‐5 mortality rate
Lag of: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Aid (Basic Health + Pop. Programmes + Food) ‐0.639*** ‐0.714*** ‐0.776*** ‐0.631*** ‐0.630*** ‐0.674***
(0.194) (0.235) (0.244) (0.184) (0.176) (0.184)
Government efficiency ‐6.149*** ‐4.486*
(2.386) (2.730)
Government efficiency * Aid ‐0.326* ‐0.398**
(0.192) (0.189)
Corruption Control ‐5.344** ‐3.733
(2.272) (2.572)
Corruption Control * Aid ‐0.264 ‐0.350**
(0.177) (0.168)
Observations 334 334 334 334 334 334
Number of countries 56 56 56 56 56 56
F‐test for instruments in first‐stage regression 75.57 6.910 4.527 44.21 11.12 7.950
Hansen J test p‐value 0.816 0.877 0.522 0.441 0.649 0.430
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Time and country effects included in all regressions
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Instruments for lagged per capita aid are trend aid and total GDP. See section 3 for a detailed 
explanation of the instruments.
Table 8. Regressions for forecasts (high mortality countries)
Dependent variable: Under‐5 mortality rate
Basic Health
Population 
Programmes Food aid
Health + 
Population + 
Food
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged Aid ‐2.117** ‐0.746** ‐1.957** ‐0.766***
(0.929) (0.334) (0.995) (0.297)
Year ‐2.691*** ‐2.805*** ‐3.144*** ‐2.449***
(0.346) (0.346) (0.293) (0.396)
Observations 499 487 442 502
Number of countries 56 56 56 56
F‐test for instruments in first‐stage regression 171.0 34.03 147.6 68.52
Hansen J test p‐value 0.437 0.587 0.937 0.314
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Time and country effects included in all regressions
 Aid variable is:
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Instruments for lagged per capita aid are trend aid and total GDP. See section 3 for a 
Table 9. Child Mortality Forecasts by 2015.
Country Basic Health
Population 
Programmes Food aid
Health + 
Population + 
Food Target 50%‐target On target
Angola 153.3 156.7 153.4 159.1 86.0 129.0 No
Bangladesh 40.4 40.3 35.9 43.5 49.2 73.8 Yes
Benin 98.0 100.9 98.2 103.3 61.5 92.2 No
Bhutan 65.8 61.9 54.4 64.7 49.3 74.0 No
Bolivia 38.6 37.3 35.0 41.1 40.7 61.1 Yes
Botswana 47.7 ‐35.7 42.6 ‐34.4 19.9 29.8 ?
Burkina Faso 143.8 146.0 141.5 147.5 67.0 100.5 No
Burundi 135.3 141.5 134.4 139.9 63.1 94.7 No
Cambodia 65.0 65.3 63.9 67.9 38.9 58.4 No
Cameroon 124.6 126.0 125.9 128.0 49.3 73.9 No
Central African Rep. 147.1 144.9 138.4 145.6 58.2 87.3 No
Chad 177.1 176.9 177.1 179.6 67.1 100.6 No
Comoros 84.5 78.3 75.7 84.1 42.6 63.9 No
Congo, Dem. Rep. 163.2 167.0 163.3 168.5 66.2 99.3 No
Congo, Rep. 90.3 89.2 91.7 91.5 34.6 51.9 No
Cote d'Ivoire 100.3 97.6 96.8 100.5 50.8 76.2 No
Djibouti 59.9 68.6 63.9 66.7 40.9 61.4 No
Equatorial Guinea 106.5 123.3 123.6 119.0 65.9 98.9 No
Eritrea 43.2 40.6 36.8 44.3 49.9 74.9 Yes
Ethiopia 95.5 94.3 86.7 95.0 69.8 104.8 No
Gabon 47.3 45.9 43.1 49.3 30.9 46.4 No
Gambia 82.6 87.7 70.6 84.2 51.0 76.6 No
Ghana 53.1 57.2 53.7 58.9 40.0 60.0 No
Guinea 134.6 133.8 128.9 136.9 77.0 115.5 No
Guinea‐Bissau 173.3 174.6 161.9 172.8 80.0 120.0 No
Haiti 66.8 64.6 62.1 65.1 50.8 76.2 No
India 50.3 48.9 45.3 52.8 39.4 59.1 No
Kenya 63.8 60.0 59.6 62.8 33.0 49.5 No
Laos 38.6 41.9 37.8 43.7 52.4 78.6 Yes
Lesotho 79.5 73.5 75.3 73.3 30.8 46.2 No
Liberia 114.6 115.0 101.1 115.4 82.3 123.5 No
Madagascar 47.1 47.0 44.4 50.8 55.6 83.4 Yes
Malawi 102.3 104.2 101.0 103.5 72.7 109.1 No
Mali 170.1 172.9 168.8 173.9 83.2 124.8 No
Mauritania 88.2 87.9 78.7 88.4 43.0 64.5 No
Mozambique 133.1 130.4 128.4 131.9 77.5 116.2 No
Namibia 36.6 32.5 20.7 24.3 36.5 ?
Nepal 36.3 35.8 31.4 38.9 47.3 71.0 Yes
Niger 160.2 163.9 155.5 163.7 101.7 152.6 No
Nigeria 133.8 133.2 129.0 136.3 70.6 105.9 No
Pakistan 67.1 67.2 64.2 70.6 43.5 65.2 No
Papua New Guinea 43.6 41.1 38.3 45.1 30.4 45.6 No
Rwanda 105.6 109.1 111.6 107.8 56.9 85.4 No
Senegal 71.8 75.7 70.5 76.7 50.3 75.4 No
Sierra Leone 188.6 190.7 183.9 190.9 95.0 142.5 No
South Africa 46.2 40.2 43.2 43.8 20.6 30.9 No
Sudan 78.9 80.5 78.6 82.7 41.2 61.8 No
Swaziland 70.7 61.0 62.0 62.6 30.8 46.2 No
Tajikistan* 43.4 45.9 42.9 48.4 38.7 58.0 No
Tanzania 89.5 91.2 90.5 92.2 54.0 81.0 No
Timor‐Leste** 42.4 47.0 26.4 40.7 49.7 74.5 Yes
Togo 77.1 80.5 77.2 82.7 50.1 75.2 No
Uganda 111.0 108.2 106.4 110.7 61.4 92.1 No
Yemen 53.2 52.4 48.3 56.0 41.6 62.4 No
Zambia 120.6 114.3 120.2 114.4 59.5 89.3 No
* Target computed based on 1992 mortality rate
**Target computed based on 1995 mortality rate
Forecasts based on:
Table 10. Child Mortality Forecasts by 2015, assuming that aid is dropped
Country Basic Health
Population 
Programmes Food aid
Health + 
Population + 
Food On target
Angola 161.5 158.1 154.4 164.0 No
Bangladesh 42.4 40.7 37.3 45.1 Yes
Benin 106.7 102.6 98.8 108.5 No
Bhutan 73.4 64.4 59.1 71.8 No
Bolivia 45.3 39.2 40.8 47.8 ?
Botswana 50.1 54.5 42.6 59.1 No
Burkina Faso 151.0 148.2 145.5 154.0 No
Burundi 145.6 143.6 140.6 148.2 No
Cambodia 71.7 68.7 65.0 74.2 No
Cameroon 127.5 126.9 126.1 130.1 No
Central African Rep. 152.8 148.6 145.2 154.2 No
Chad 180.2 177.7 180.6 182.9 No
Comoros 86.7 79.6 75.7 86.2 No
Congo, Dem. Rep. 171.2 168.1 164.4 173.0 No
Congo, Rep. 93.2 91.1 96.3 96.3 No
Cote d'Ivoire 102.7 101.5 98.2 105.9 No
Djibouti 79.3 73.5 68.6 80.5 No
Equatorial Guinea 146.9 129.2 123.6 139.7 No
Eritrea 47.5 43.7 41.6 50.8 ?
Ethiopia 100.5 97.5 94.6 103.1 No
Gabon 52.0 47.6 43.1 52.8 No
Gambia 93.3 89.7 86.1 96.1 No
Ghana 61.9 58.8 55.1 64.3 No
Guinea 136.7 135.0 131.9 140.2 No
Guinea‐Bissau 181.4 176.8 175.5 183.2 No
Haiti 73.5 73.7 72.6 81.0 No
India 50.7 49.1 45.4 53.2 No
Kenya 68.6 66.5 61.6 71.9 No
Laos 47.8 42.9 40.1 48.8 Yes
Lesotho 86.2 85.9 81.6 91.0 No
Liberia 130.7 118.7 120.3 132.5 No
Madagascar 52.6 48.0 47.1 54.9 Yes
Malawi 114.0 112.1 108.4 118.8 No
Mali 179.5 175.7 171.5 181.3 No
Mauritania 95.1 90.3 91.4 98.4 No
Mozambique 141.6 137.8 134.1 144.7 No
Namibia 40.7 Out 33.6 52.4 No
Nepal 38.9 37.1 32.6 41.7 Yes
Niger 168.1 165.0 163.3 170.8 No
Nigeria 137.0 135.3 129.0 139.6 No
Pakistan 69.2 67.4 64.4 71.7 No
Papua New Guinea 55.6 43.8 38.3 52.2 No
Rwanda 123.5 119.9 115.6 127.0 No
Senegal 81.7 77.4 73.6 83.2 No
Sierra Leone 197.2 193.3 191.7 199.7 No
South Africa 47.6 46.8 43.2 51.2 No
Sudan 84.2 81.2 81.1 86.3 No
Swaziland 71.8 75.8 68.6 80.7 No
Tajikistan* 50.8 46.8 47.8 54.0 No
Tanzania 99.4 96.8 91.7 102.0 No
Timor‐Leste** 62.8 50.6 52.0 61.8 No
Togo 84.2 81.6 77.3 86.3 No
Uganda 116.5 113.7 109.7 119.6 No
Yemen 55.7 53.1 50.7 58.7 No
Zambia 135.9 130.5 124.3 138.2 No
* Target computed based on 1992 mortality rate
**Target computed based on 1995 mortality rate
Dropped aid:
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Appendix Table A: Summary statistics by aid sectors (Disbursements in 2008 dollars)
Total 2008
Per capita, 
2008
Per capita, Average 
2000‐2008
Per capita, Change 
2000‐2008
SECTOR (Million dollars) (Dollars) (Dollars) (Dollars)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Education, Level Unspecified 2 233 9.65 7.38 6.2
Basic Education 3 156 4.67 2.35 1.43
Secondary Education 1 138 6.61 2.4 1.67
Post‐Secondary Education 4 010 3.22 3.13 1.62
Health, General 2 152 4.5 3.83 2.56
Basic Health 5 366 3.11 2.04 1.02
Popul. Pol./Progr. & Reproductive Health 8 228 3.98 1.84 1.59
Water Supply & Sanitation 5 402 3.63 2.89 0.7
Government & Civil Society‐general 12 172 10.93 7.96 5.53
Conflict, Peace & Security 3 350 1.81 1.4 0.52
Other Social Infrastructure & Services 5 991 8.63 4.28 2.56
Transport & Storage 7 588 9.73 6.82 ‐1.38
Communications 525 0.55 0.45 0.21
Energy 5 237 3.3 1.99 0.56
Banking & Financial Services 2 905 1.06 0.71 0.21
Business & Other Services 1 985 1.21 0.98 0.76
Agriculture 4 734 4.75 2.63 1.09
Forestry 556 0.16 0.26 0.02
Fishing 344 1.85 3.06 0.66
Industry 1 393 0.83 0.62 0.21
Mineral Resources & Mining 241 0.24 0.29 ‐0.01
Construction 35 0.02 0.02 0
Trade Policies & Regulations 849 0.33 0.42 ‐1.56
Tourism 91 0.22 0.29 0.04
General Environment Protection 3 031 1.9 1.59 ‐1.4
Other Multisector 5 765 15.05 9.32 8.06
General Budget Support 4 358 9.81 9.7 7.74
Develop. Food Aid/Food Security Assist. 1 986 1.65 1.03 0.67
Other Commodity Asssistance 243 0.04 0.08 ‐0.06
Action Relating to Debt 11 929 13.86 10.18 8.48
Emergency Response 9 498 3.35 2.79 0.77
Reconstruction Relief & Rehabilitation 1 307 0.58 0.65 0.51
Disaster Prevention & Preparedness 343 0.18 0.08 0.08
Administrative Costs of Donors 6 483 0.39 0.3 0.28
Support to NGO's 1 590 0.53 0.61 0.6
Refugees in Donor Countries 2 509 0.02 0.36 0.2
Unallocated/Unspecified 3 197 1.3 2.5 1.71
Total 131920 133.65 97.23 53.85
Per capita figures are simple averages across aid recipient countries
Appendix Table B: Summary statistics by aid recipient country (2000‐2008)
Country
Data 
Frequency
Under‐5 
Mortality
Per capita 
aid Country
Data 
Frequency
Under‐5 
Mortality
Per capita 
aid
Albania 9 21 104 Lesotho 9 114 47
Algeria 9 39 10 Liberia 9 156 94
Angola 9 188 31 Libya 3 20 6
Antigua and Barbuda 9 16 58 Macedonia, FYR 9 15 111
Argentina 9 18 3 Madagascar 9 80 61
Armenia 9 29 82 Malawi 9 140 74
Azerbaijan 9 51 26 Malaysia 9 8 10
Bahrain 5 13 1 Maldives 9 31 98
Bangladesh 9 71 11 Mali 9 205 81
Barbados 4 14 9 Malta 3 7 3
Belarus 3 13 8 Mauritania 9 120 132
Belize 9 23 44 Mauritius 9 17 57
Benin 9 132 67 Mexico 9 22 2
Bhutan 9 93 108 Moldova 9 21 42
Bolivia 9 69 109 Mongolia 9 46 79
Bosnia‐Herzegovina 9 16 134 Montenegro 6 12 76
Botswana 9 78 75 Morocco 9 47 33
Brazil 9 28 2 Mozambique 9 166 88
Burkina Faso 9 178 61 Namibia 9 67 79
Burundi 9 173 47 Nepal 9 67 18
Cambodia 9 98 33 Nicaragua 9 34 172
Cameroon 9 156 76 Niger 9 195 48
Cape Verde 9 35 332 Nigeria 9 166 21
Central African Rep. 9 178 35 Oman 9 17 3
Chad 9 208 34 Pakistan 9 98 13
Chile 9 10 6 Panama 9 25 14
China 8 29 2 Papua New Guinea 9 73 65
Colombia 9 23 16 Paraguay 9 27 20
Comoros 9 110 66 Peru 9 31 23
Congo, Dem. Rep. 9 199 36 Philippines 9 36 13
Congo, Rep. 9 121 117 Rwanda 9 148 77
Costa Rica 9 12 17 Samoa 9 30 245
Cote d'Ivoire 9 131 33 Saudi Arabia 8 22 0
Croatia 9 7 37 Senegal 9 107 98
Djibouti 9 101 107 Serbia 9 10 166
Dominica 9 13 219 Seychelles 9 13 98
Dominican Republic 9 36 20 Sierra Leone 9 223 86
Ecuador 9 30 20 Slovenia 3 5 6
Egypt 9 34 19 Solomon Islands 9 36 355
El Salvador 9 25 40 South Africa 9 76 14
Equatorial Guinea 9 158 63 Sri Lanka 9 18 41
Eritrea 9 72 52 St. Lucia 9 18 109
Ethiopia 9 127 31 Sudan 9 112 29
Fiji 9 18 61 Suriname 9 33 184
Gabon 9 78 88 Swaziland 9 100 35
Gambia 9 118 54 Syria 9 19 9
Georgia 9 32 80 Tajikistan 9 78 24
Ghana 9 89 81 Tanzania 9 126 60
Grenada 9 17 139 Thailand 9 17 12
Guatemala 9 44 30 Timor‐Leste 9 81 262
Guinea 9 165 33 Togo 9 112 23
Guinea‐Bissau 9 207 80 Tonga 9 20 262
Guyana 9 41 146 Trinidad and Tobago 9 35 8
Haiti 9 101 42 Tunisia 9 24 54
Honduras 9 35 100 Turkey 9 31 13
India 9 80 3 Turkmenistan 9 59 4
Indonesia 9 48 11 Uganda 9 142 59
Iran 9 40 2 Ukraine 3 16 11
Jamaica 9 32 48 Uruguay 9 16 8
Jordan 9 28 119 Uzbekistan 9 50 6
Kazakhstan 9 37 12 Vanuatu 9 21 242
Kenya 9 95 26 Venezuela 9 21 2
Kiribati 9 55 254 Viet Nam 9 27 23
Kyrgyz Republic 9 44 36 Yemen 9 84 17
Laos 9 73 46 Zambia 9 157 123
Lebanon 9 18 81 Zimbabwe 7 109 19
 Under‐5 mortality per thousand children born alive. Aid is disbursements in 2008 dollars. 2000‐2008 averages
